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ABSTRACT
Three main types of mortgages are fixed interest contracts which
automatically fall due on the sale of a dwelling, fixed rate loans which
are assumable by a buyer, and floating rate instruments. When interest rates
rise, the fall in the economic value of these assets in savings and loan
associations' portfolios varies from one form of mortgage to another. For
either of the fixed interest rate contracts, the cash flow from the mortgage
is constant as long as it has not been prepaid. If the interest rate rises,
the homeowner has a nominal capital gain, since his loan is then at a below
market interest rate. He would therefore be less likely to prepay. The fall
in the savings and loans' net worth arises from two factors: (1) the interest
rate differential for mortgages of a fixed duration, and (2) the endogenous
lengthening of the duration.
This paper is an attempt to measure the dependence of the duration of
mortgages on the implicit unrealized capital gain of mortgage holders resulting
from interest rate changes. Our estimate is based on a sample of 4,000 mortgages
issued in California which were active in 1975. We follow their payment history
from 1975 to 1982. Using a Proportional Hazards Model, we estimate the percentage
reduction in prepayment probability associated with interest rate changes. Our
results indicate that for due—on—sale fixed interest rate mortgages, a sudden
increase in the interest rate from 10 to 15 percent would induce a 23 percent
loss in the economic value of the mortgage. If the mortgage were assumable,
this loss would be 28 percent. Correspondingly, the 6—year average time to
repayment of mortgages at a constant interest rate would be lengthened to nine
years for due—on—sale mortgages, and 13—1/2 years for assumable ones.
Professor Jerry Green Professor John B. Shoven
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Harvard University Stanford University
Cambridge, MA 02138 Stanford, CA 94305
(617) 495—4560 (415) 497—32731. Introduction
Saving and loan institutions have experienced extremely difficult
times in the last four or five years largely because of the term structure
of their assets and liabilities. Most of these institutions hold relatively
long term fixed yield mortgage assets, while their liabilities are fairly
short term savings accounts. Both long and short term interest rates rose
in the 1980—82 period above their level in the preceding period. This
depressed the value of the saving and loans' mortgage assets, causing the
net worth of many of these institutions to become negative. This fact, however,
was somewhat disguised by standard accounting conventions which do not mark
assets to their market value. In addition to the negative net worth situation,
the institutions faced severe cash flow problems caused by the higher interest
rates on liabilities and the reduced prepayment experience on mortgages.
The purpose of this study is more limited than an overall assessment
of the economic position of the saving and loans. Our purpose is to look at
the nature of the mortgage asset itself and ask what determines the probability
that the mortgage will be paid off at a particular time or age. For years, the
industry has seemingly worked with "rules of thumb." At one time, the conven-
tional assumption was that mortgages would, on average, be paid off in seven
years. The rule currently seems to be 12 years. We want to judge whether these
rules are adequate for valuing a mortgage portfolio and, implicitly, what caused
the "rule" to change from seven to 12 years?
A mortgage asset is similar to an annuity. The owner receives a
fixed stream of dollars for the life of the contract (or, in the case of an
annuity, over the life of the owner). The value of both assets is sensitive
12
to interest rate fluctuations. A change in the interest or discount rate
from ten to 11 percent, for example, will change the nominal value of a 30
year annuity or mortgage by almost ten percent. There are key Institutional
differences between mortgage assets and annuities, however. First, the
mortgage borrower is usually free to buy out of the contract, subject to
some modest prepayment penalties, if interest rates fall. It is as if the
lending institution had sold a call option to the borrower on its mortgage
asset at the time the contract was agreed upon. Presumably this call feature
is priced in the interest rate and other terms of the mortgage. Second, most
mortgages have traditionally had a due—on—sale clause, meaning that the lender
couldclaim the face value of the mortgage if the borrower sells the residence.
If interest rates are lower than the contracted rate of the mortgage at the time
of the sale, this option of the lender will not be enforced.However, if the
prevailingrate is higher than the contracted rate, the homeowner is forced to
give up a below—market loan should he sell the house. This sacrifice or "lock—in"
presumably affects the likelihood of selling and therefore the effective expected
maturity of the mortgage asset and its value. One would not expect people to switch
houses as frequently if they would have to exchange their low interest rate mortgage
for a new one at the higher market rates. The point is that the effective maturity
of the mortgage asset is endogenous to the evolution of interest rates and,
perhaps, other economic variables.
The main goal of our research has been to estimate the sensitivity of
mortgage prepayments to prevailing interest rates. The subject is of immediate
importance because of the precarious financial condition of saving and loan
and saving bank institutions in the U.S. Since due—on—sale fixed—interest rate
mortgages play a major role in their portfolios, assessing their economic net
worth position requires valuation of these assets which, in turn, depends on
their effective or expected maturity.3
One reason why assessing the net worth of the saving and loan
financial intermediaries is of current importance is the level of merger
activity in the industry. In a fair number of these mergers effective
subsidies have been made to the acquiring institution by the FSLIC or FDIC.
The subsidy is deemed necessary to entice the purchaser to absorb a weak
institution. All parties in such arrangements need to be able to access
the true net worth of the acquired institution. Another demand for mortgage
valuation comes from financial markets. Not only is there merger activity
in the intermediaries themselves, but there also are financial instruments
such as pass—through certificates, mortgage backed bonds, and REITs which
must be priced in markets. The sensitivity of mortgage values to interest
rate changes is clearly important in this determination. In addition to
the standard negative relationship between valuation and interest rates
as with fixed term bonds, mortgage assets have the interest effect on
maturity which is the subject of our study.
There has been a great deal of activity recently with respect to
due—on—sale clauses and their enforceability. In 1978 the case of Cynthia
J. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, et al. prohibited the use of due—on—sale
clauses for the sole purpose of raising mortgage rates. By denying those
owning mortgage assets of their option to collect face value on sale
of the residence, a claim of substantial value was transferred from the
lending institutions to mortgage holders. Dietrich (1982) estimated that
the loss in mortgage value due to the unenforceability of DOS clauses amounted
to more than the total net worth for state—chartered California S&Ls in 1981.
He figured that the value of the mortgage portfolios of the California
institutions was reduced by 9.3 percent by this one action. More recently,
of course, the U.S. Supreme Court found in 1982 that DOS clauses are4
enforceable for federally chartered institutions. It is unclear whether
the legal aspects are completely settled at this time, but the episode
vividly demonstrated the value of the DOS provision to lending organizations.
The approach we have taken is to collect data on individual mortgages
and analyze their prepayment experience. A large part of our effort has
gone into the collection of the data itself. We have followed the prepayment
experience of almost 4,000 mortgages of two California saving and loans for
the eight years 1975—1982. What we then estimate is a life—table for mortgages.
The analogy with mortality tables is rather complete. We compute for each n
(n =0,l...,29) the conditional probabilities of a mortgage which has been
outstanding n years of being paid off in the (n+l)st year. The sensitivity
of this probability series to the "lock—in" effect of interest rates is
estimated. An analogy would be calculating the effect of certain climattic
changes on mortality. The estimation techniques used are identical to those
used by demographers for life tables.
The next section of the paper presents the methodology and estimation
procedure we utilize. Then, the third section describes our data set in some
detail. The fourth section presents the estimation results and our interpretation
of them. We conclude with some observations on the usefulness of theinormatinn
we have learned.5
2. Methodology
We want to estimate the effect of changes in interest rates on
the turnover rates ofmortgages. It is most important to recognize that
the primary determinants of the decision to sell a house are not related to
interest rate fluctuations. They are largely concerned with the personal
circumstances of the owner: job changes, births of children, changes in
family income or wealth, changes in taste for the type of housing, divorce,
marriage, etc. We have no way of knowing why any given mortgage dd or
did not turn over in a given year. The only evidence of individual
characteristics that we do have is the length of tenure in the house.
There are, thus, two relevant variables in our study: length of
tenure in the house, and an imputed "recapitalized" or "market" value of
the mortgages. We want to estimate the probability of turnover at each tenure
as a function of the relationship between this "market" value of the mortgage
and its remaining principal balance.
Estimating the effect of the interest rate lock—in on mortgage
prepayments presents the problem of a time varying covariate. In addition,
the fact that much of the sample remained alive in 1982 (the last year of
observation), gives us the commonly encountered econometric problem of a
censored sample. Below we discuss these problems in detail and describe
our econometric method.6
The Problem of Parameterization and Sample Size
The most flexible specification would allow for a different hazard
function for each value of the exogenous variables affecting turnover. However,
estimating separate life tables for each risk—exposure category would require
vastly more data than we have available. Let us suppose that we divided the
interest rate differentials or lock—in magnitudes into five or ten groups.
The sample size within each group would be less than 1,000. For some ages,
-—— r— f particularlyL1LueLJULLU LeLL UL mortgages
at risk would be too low to permit an accurate assessment of their turnover rate.
Separatingthe sample in this way, ::even if it were possible, would implicitly
assume that there is no relationship at all between the turnover rates at the
same age for various interest rate differentials. But economic theory and
common sense tell us that the extent of the lock—in effect should be increasing
in the interest rate differential. An accurate estimation procedure should take
these restrictions into account.
Moreover, even though we have quite a large sample, the number of
parameters that would have to be estimated by the separate group method
would be beyond what the data could reliably provide. Morestructure, that
is to say, a more parsimonious parameterization is needed. Weemploy the
Proportional Hazards Model, which is widely used in demography and medical
research, as well as in economics.1 Under the Proportional Hazards Hypothesis,
the probability of a turnover can be divided into two multiplicative factors
as follows:
probability of turnover
of mortgage age (a) if (1)
exogenous factors are
=
X1,.. .,xat time t n
1SeeHeckman and Singer (1982a and 1982b).7
Here A(a) is the "base line hazard" ——thatproportion of the population
that would turn over even under completely stationary, homogeneous conditions.
The second factor, 71(x1,. ..x)is greater or less than one according to
whether the exogenous factorsx1,...,x make turnover more or less likely.
The essential assumption is that of proportionality. Ifx1,...,x make
turnover more likely at one age, they have an equiproportional impact at
all ages. Finally, it is implicit in the above formula that the effect of
X-,..xtmturnovertime—separable. Past attrIbutes of the environment 1
and anticipated future values are assumed not to have any affect on turnover
in the present.
We defer a discussion of the functional form of ir(x1,...,x) and the
choice of exogenous variables to the section on estimation, below. While we
continue to develop the methodology for the general a variable case, in the
empirical section we will deal only with the "interest rate lock—in" variable,
i.e., a =1.
Non—constancy of Factors Affecting Turnover
The standard proportional hazards model is based onthe presumption
that factors affecting turnover are specific to the individualbut do not
vary during the period over whichthe individual is followed in the sample.
For instance, in a medical context, a history of previousillness may be
known and may be thought relevant to the life expectancyof the patient.
The selected method of treatment in a randomizedclinical trial would also
be such a time—invariant variable.
In our model it is essential to recognize that thedifferential
between an. imputed "market" value of the loan and thecontractual value is
fluctuating over time. The holder of a mortgage has an optionto prepay,
and the value of that option depends on his expectationsabout the course of
future interest rates. We assume that borrowersconsider the current value8
of their mortgage in deciding whether or not to prepay. They do not
attempt to buy options or futures contracts whose value would fluctuate so
as to insulate them from the risks inherent in the mortgage contract.
They make their decisions myopically, year by year. For the vast majority
of homeowners, this is undoubtedly correct.
This time—separability assumption allows us to estimate the hazard
function ir (x1 ,... ,x)even in the time—varying case, by using a maximum
lkelhood technique that treats each year for each mortgage as a separate
observation whose value is the binary decision: prepay or do not prepay.
The details are given in the estimation section.
Estimation
The Proportional Hazards Model described above is implemented by
parameterizing the function ir as follows:
(2) ir(xi,...,x) =e
We first discuss the estimation of the coefficients when the
exogenous variables x1,...,x are fixed for each mortgage. Of course, as
interest rates do vary, that is not the case. A more general estimation
procedure is necessary for the time—varying case. We discuss this subsequently.
The data in the time—invariant case gives, for each observation, the
issue date of the mortgage, its termination date if it was prepaid, the original
interest rate, and the original principal amount. From this we compute the
magnitudes actually used as the exogenous x variables in the hazard function.
If the mortgage was still active at the time our data collection stopped, the9
observationis referred to as "censored;" if it has been prepaid, we refer
to its age at prepayment as the "failure age."
A typical mortgage will be denoted by the subscript L, and the total
number of mortgages is k, thus we let L =1,...,k. The data relevant to each
mortgage is a vector of n numbers which may vary over the lifetime of the
mortgage. At calendar time t, the characteristics of mortgage & are described
by
x =(x1,.
For each mortgage, t runs from its issue date to the termination date. If
it is observed to be prepaid, the last t is the prepayment date; if it is
not prepaid, the last t is the date of our study, that is 1982.
Because the maximum possible age of a mortgage is 30 years, we let
i =1,...,30describe the age of the mortgage at termination, whether this
isa prepayment ("failure") or a non—prepayment as of 1982("censored").
Foreachi, let be the set of mortgages that failed at age i, and let d1
be the number of mortgages in D. Let R1 be the set of mortgages at risk
of failure at age i; that is, the mortgages that did not fail at any age
less than i. Since, at age i, some mortgages fail and some do not, is
a subset of R1.
We now describe the log—likelihood of a given sample. It is a function
of the vector of parameters (B =B]...,B) that correspond to the influence
of each of the n characteristics of mortgage £ at time t, =(xi&,..
.,xQ).
In vector notation, the Proportional Hazards Model (2) is written
8x ir(x)e
The log likelihood is factored into a part due age alone and the part above10
due to the variables x. The parameters B are found by maximizing the
second of these parts.
Kalbfleish and Prentice (1980) present an approximation to this
expression, known as the partial likelihood. Let
Sj
LcD1
XLt
where tL is the calendar time at which mortgage L failed (i.e., it was age 1).
The log partial likelihood is
30 ( xLB
(3) s —d1og
e
i=1 LeR(i)
where tisthe calendar time at which mortgage L is age 1. (Kalbfleish
and Prentice discuss this partial likelihood method in their Chapter 4,
Section 4.2.2.)
Given an estimate of B, we can estimate the hazard for a mortgage
age i whose characteristics are x2, which is
Li
xLt
(4) Ae
by a second maximum likelihood method. Defining a 1—A1 as the baseline
survival probability at each age i, the overall likelihood of the sample is
30 r xLt•B xLt 'Bi
(5) II 11 (l—a,e ) haeLi
1=1
[.cD(i)
1
LER(i)—Dj)
(Kalbfleishand Prentice present an iterative method for the maximiation of
(5) with respect to (a1,... ,a30) in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.)11
The likelihood functions, equations (3) and (5),are maximized by
an iterative Gaussian or Newton—type technique. The approach isto make a
first guess or estimate of a or 8, calculate the firstderivatives of the
log likelihood function and the matrix of second partials and solvethe
linearized system of equations for a zero of the first derivatives.This
will give a "next guess" value for a or B which meet the firstorder conditions
for a maximum, except that the assumed linearity of the firstderivatives is
inaccurate. The procedure is repeated untilconvergence is achieved. It
should be noted that only local maximaarecalculated from this type of procedure
and that multiple equilibria are a realpossibility. We have not experienced
this problem as far as we can tell, but it cannot be ruledout a priori.
A principal advantage of the ProportionalHazard specification is that the
maximum likelihood estimate of 8 is separable fromthe estimation of the
baseline hazard function X(a). Therefore,8 is computed first and X(a) is
computed by a separate maximum likelihood routineholding B fixed.
The key covariate (x) for our analysis is a measure of the lock—in
caused by an interest rate differential between thatprevailing in the
mortgage market and the contracted rate of the mortgage. We considereda
number of specifications of this phenomenon. Themost straightforward, 'of
course,would simply be the dollar value difference between thetwo valuations.
We felt that this was not the correct specificationsince a $15,000 lock—in
presumably affects the owner of a $60,000 dwelling more thansomeone who owns
a $300,000 home. It was our feeling that the prepayment probabilitywas
probably affected by the percentage of the lock—in relative to the value ofthe
house. The lock—in effect can be thought of as a transactioncost of
moving similar to the brokers fees (which traditionally are five or six
percent). Unfortunately, one piece of information not in our data set12
is the market value of the dwelling. What we have done is create a
lock—in variable defined as the difference between the face and market
values of the mortgage (where the market value is calculated using
current mortgage rates for the full remaining life of the mortgage) divided
by the initial principal amount updated by the ratio of the price index for
housing to its level at the time of issuance. This gives us a proxy for the
percentage lock—in relative to the "real" initial mortgage amount. If house-
holds financed similar proportions of their purchase, then it would be propor-
tional to our preferred lock—in measure. As it stands, this measure imperfectly
captures what we would expect to be most closely related to prepayment behavior,
but it seems the most satisfactory available option given the data.13
3. Data Set
The data set contains 3,938 mortgages held by two large California
Savings and Loan Associations. A sample of mortgages active in a base year
was selected and followed through 1982. The base year in each case was
chosen on the basis of data availability; for the first association, data
were available beginning in 1975 and for the second association, data were
available in 1976. The mortgages were all issued for California homes and
all areas of the State were represented. Officials at both S&Ls believe
their portfolios are typical of those of California savings and loans.
(The data set we assembled with identifiers removed can be obtained by
writing the authors.)
Approximately 52 percent of the sample came from the first association.
Extensive information was available regarding the active mortgages, including
original mortgage amount, interest rate, principal and interest payments,
current principal balance, payment history, loan—to—value ratio, term, and due
date. Information on paid off mortgages was much more limited; usually interest
rate, principal and interest payment, balance at payoff, and date of payoff were
available. The sample consists primarily of conventional mortgages, although
some VA and FHA mortgages are included. All of the mortgages have fixed
interest rates.
The remaining 48 percent of the sample came from the second association.
Eighty—four percent are conventional mortgages, ten percent are VA mortgages,
and six percent are FHA mortgages. Information available on the active
mortgages included principal amount, interest rate, monthly principal and
interest payment, issue date, mortgage type, and impounds. For paid off14
mortgages, data include interest rate, principal and interest payment,
mortgage type, and payoff date.
While we know the aggregate proportions for conventional, FHA, and
VA mortgages, we do not know which individual mortgages are of which type.
This is unfortunate, since VA and FHA loans are contractually assumable and
should, therefore, be treated separately. Obtaining this information for
our data set is difficult or impossible at this point, but this problem should
be recognized in designing similar studies in the future. The effect of this
mixture of mortgages on our estimates will be discussed below.
Our data set is described in Tables 1 and 2. The first of these
shows the age and payoff distribution for the entire set. Of the 3,938 mortgages,
2,037 were paid off in the 1975 to 1982 period, while 1,901 were still active
at the end of 1982. Most of our mortgages were issued between 1962 and 1975,
and thus were ages 0 through 20 in the 1975 to 1982 interval. Table 2 gives
descriptive data for the sample by mortgage issue year. The rising pattern
of interest rates is shown, as is the concentration of the sample (in terms
of total principal amount) in mortgages issued between 1970 and 1975.
There are a number of problems with the data set. Among the relatively
minor, technical difficulties, issue dates for paid off mortgages had to be
estimated by loan number. At both associations, numbers are assigned to loans
chronologically within large groups of numbers, so paid off mortgages were
assigned the issue dates of active mortgages with similar loan numbers. This
method of dating is not precise, and some mistakes were surely made, but it
is unlikely that any assigned issue year is off by more than one year in either
direction. Original mortgage amounts were not always available for paid off
mortgages, so these vlaues were calculated assuming each mortgage had a 30
year term; almost all active mortgages had 30 year terms, so this is not a bad
assumption.15
TABLE 1
PAYOFF EXPERIENCE BY ISSUE YEAR FOR 1975—1982
Issue PayoffYears
Total
Each
1981 1982Active Row Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1947 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
51 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
52 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
53 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
54 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 7
55 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 4 7
56 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 7
57 0 1 3 4 2 0 0 0 5 15
58 0 3 2 2 3 1 1 0 3 15
59 1 4 9 6 10 1 0 0 3 34
60 2 1 13 8 1 0 1 0 9 35
61 6 5 14 11 6 5 3 3 25 78
62 9 4 18 10 8 12 4 2 50117
63 8 9 33 13 19 6 5 2104199
64 9 11 30 24 11 6 5 2113211
65 6 11 35 20 20 5 3 5116221
66 0 3 13 7 5 3 0 3 62 96
67 4 5 26 13 13 2 4 2 4 153
68 5 5 17 9 13. 2 0 3 75129
69 8 5 19 6 6 8 3 1 70126
70 11 18 41 15 19 4 1 0 80189
71 21 31 46 22 33 8 4 1140306
72 45 46 81 59 40 14 3 11292591
73 23 40 107 58 37 11 5 7309597
74 17 43 96 43 46 15 3 5187455
75 0 21 67 29 28 8 4 4132293
76 0 10 1 7 2 0 1 32 53
TOTALS: Paid off2,037 1,901 3,93816
TABLE2
AVERAGE MORTGAGESIZEAND INTEREST RATE BYYEAROFISSUE
Issue
Number
of
Total
Principal
Value
Average
Principal
Value
Average
Interest
Year Mortgages (dollars) (dollars) Rate
1947 1 $ 15,267.34 $ 15,267.34 6.50
51 1 18,650.00 18,650.00 5.00
52 1 18,650.00 18,650.00 5.00
53 1 18,650.00 18,650.00 5.00
54 7 72,586.68 10,369.53 5.07
55 7 84,294.80 12,042.12 4.75
56 7 93,511.38 13,358.77 5.78
57 15 219,853.42 14,656.89 5.21
58 15 238,614.14 15,907.61 6.14
59 34 844,513.25 24,838.63 6.46
60 35 569,492.31 16,271.21 6.60
61 78 1,540,570.25 19,750.90 6.40
62 117 2,512,234.50 21,472.09 6.45
63 199 5,157,870.50 25,918.95 6.37
64 211 4,909,534.00 23,267.93 6.43
65 221 5,159,343.50 23,345.45 6.40
66 96 2,141,375.25 22,305.99 6.51
67 153 3,688,972.25 24,110.93 6.56
68 129 3,958,028.25 30,682.39 7.06
69 126 3,605,869.25 28,618.01 7.84
70 189 7,119,306.00 37,668.29 8.27
71 306 10,087,308.00 32,965.06 7.49
72 591 20,907,446.00 35,376.39 7.35
73 597 21,036,692.00 35,237.34 7.75
74 455 16,026,642.00 35,223.39 8.91
75 293 11,762,383.00 40,144.65 9.49
76 53 3,755,278.75 72,216.90 8.5617
Another problem involves the sample of "old" (20 year or longer)
mortgages. A random sample of 2,000 mortgages active in 1975 will yield
few old mortgages because associations currently issuea much larger number
of mortgages each year than they did in the l950s, and most of themortgages
that were issued in the early l950s were paid off before the baseyear of1975.
While mortgages exist for each age, for the longest lives theremay be only
two or three mortgages available. The sample would have to be eitherincreased
drastically or drawn on a stratified basis to correct this problem.
The most severe problem, however, is that the two institutions, while
now federally chartered, were state chartered until 1981. Both of them changed
the nature of their charter largely because of the Wellenkamp decision regarding
the enforceability of due—on—sale clauses. Both institutions included due—on—
sale clauses in their mortgages and enforced its provisions for single—family
home mortgage contracts before the court decision, but were prohibited from
doing so thereafter unless they could show that allowing assumption by the
purchaser of the house would impair the security of the mortgage due to an
increased risk of default. For practical purposes, this meant that the DOS
clauses were not enforceable. This situation has been reversed with the
DeLaCuesta decision and the Cam—St. Germain Act in 1982, but their impact
was not effective until after the completion of our data sample.
The approach we have taken is to divide the sample into two periods,
1975—1978, and 1979—1982, and separately estimate for each of these intervals
the sensitivity of prepayment experience to interest rate fluctuations. Clearly
this reduces the power of our estimation procedures, since it leaves us with
a smaller number of observations in each of the two periods, but our estimates
are still reasonably precise. It also permits us to judge the effect of the
Wellenkamp decision on prepayment experience and hence the valuation of mortgage
portfolios.18
4. Results
In our empirical work, we have used the Proportional Hazards Model
with one variable. The lock—in variable is defined as
iface value1 —marketvalue1 lock—in =
initialprincipal amount1 x t
P0
where P is a price index for residential housing at time t and P0 is that
index at the time the mortgage was Issued.
This lock—in measure is calculated for each mortgage still alive in
each year during the 1975—1982 interval. Since the mortgages in our sample
were issued between 1947 and 1976, mortgages of all ages are observed. Tables
3 and 4 show the number of mortgages which reached each age in the 1975—1978
and the 1979—1982 interval respectively. Again, the data are separated in this
way because of the Wellenkamp decision. Any mortgage which reached a particular
age in the interval of observation is termed "at risk." The number of mortgages
which were at risk for each age is shown in the first column of Tables 3 and 4.
The number which prepaid (or "died") is shown in the second columns. The third
and fourth columns report the average lock—in for all at risk mortgages and
for only those which prepaid, respectively. Interestingly, the average lock—in
is lower for those mortgages which paid off for almost every age in both the
pre—Wellenkamp period and in the 1979—1982 interval. This gives some preliminary
indication that interest rate lock—in may be an important determinant of
prepayment probabilities.
The maximum likelihood estimates confirm this preliminary finding and
also allow us to measure the impact of the Wellenkamp decision. The estimate
forin the pre—Wellenkamp period is —4.37 with a standard error of .55, while19
TABLE 3
LOCK—INBYMORTGAGE AGE FOR THOSEPAIDOFF
AND FOR ALLATRISK 1975—1978
Average Average
Lock-in Lock-in
for Those for Those
Mortgage Nbr.at Nbr.Paid at Risk Paid Off
Age Risk Off (%) (%)
1 800 47 0.12 0.69
2 1350 134 4.23 2.44
3 1765 210 698 4.80
4 1685 217 8.52 7.23
5 1401 181 9.07 9.07
6 977 131 8.68 9.04
7 615 73 7.41 6.23
8 509 43 7.62 6.20
9 458 28 8.35 7.29
10 563 44 8.92 8.37
11 637 46 8.57 7.97
12 685 61 7.96 7.30
13 668 68 7.45 7.05
14 529 67 6.87 6.00
15 360 38 6.41 5.64
16 220 26 5.75 5.09
17 133 28 5.16 4.73
18 78 20 4.75 3.74
19 54 10 4.56 4.13
20 37 6 4.24 3.94
21 30 5 3.83 3.35
22 19 3 3.11 2.44
23 14 0 2.66 0.00
24 9 0 2.08 0.00
25 4 0 1.47 0.00
26 4 0 1.02 0.00
27 3 0 0.63 0.00
28 3 0 0.31 0.00
29 2 0 0.10 0.00
30 1 0 0.00 0.0020
TABLE4
LOCK—INBY MORTGAGE ACE FORTHOSE PAID OFF
AND FOR ALLATRISK 1979-1982
Average Average
Lock-in Lock-in
for Those for Those
Mortgage Nbr.at Nbr.Paid at Risk Paid Of f
Age Risk Of f (%) (Z)
1 0 0
2 0 0 ...
3 42 7 15.019 14.785
4 211 30 10.424 13.050
5 437 54 13.186 12.465
6 752 57 16.108 14.998
7 1023 58 17.077 15.497
8 1019 57 17.896 14.729
9 879 37 17.812 13.881
10 621 25 16.459 15.874
11 397 23 14.013 11.014
12 339 18 12.357 10.952
13 314 8 11.883 10.257
14 385 30 10.836 9.540
15 393 18 10.152 8.590
16 321 31 9.990 8.110
17 248 24 9.516 8.170
18 114 25 8.486 7.480
19 209 12 7.677 7.221
20 107 15 6.678 5.458
21 50 8 5.709 4.969
22 24 3 4.570 3.767
23 15 2 3.768 3.307
24 16 2 2.906 2.350
25 17 2 2.118 1.452
26 12 1 1.580 1.426
27 10 1 1.049 0.893
28 6 1 0.532 0.464
29 1 1 0.164 0.16421
the figure for the 1979—82 period Is —13.07 with a standard error of 1.37.
To aid in interpreting these numbers, note that they indicate that a modest
ten percent lock—in would have reduced prepayment probabilities by 33 percent
in the due—on—sale period 1975—78 and by 63 percent in 1979—82. The results
indicate that even in a due—on—sale regime, the likelihood of prepayment depends
on the relationship between the contractual rate on the mortgage and the market
rate. In the period when the due—on—sale clause was unenforceable, the prepayment
experience was even more sensitive to interest rates. In that period, prepayment
would seldom occur unless the buyer could for some reason not asssume the loan.
Also, for older mortgages the lock—in is smaller (relative to the current cost
of the house) and therefore the loan may be prepaid at the time of sale.
Recall that a small fraction of our mortgages were FHA and VA
loans which are contractually assumable. This would bias the estimate
in the 1975—78 interval upwards in absolute value. Therefore, the large
effect we attribute to the Wellenkaiup decision may be underestimated)
The estimated base line hazard as a function of mortgage age is shown
in Table 5. The hazards for the first 18 years or so are estimated with
reasonable precision, while for inortages older than that the relative scarcity
of data means that the hazard cannot be precisely determined.
Tables 6 and 7 show the sensitivity to market interest rates of the
cash flow (interest plus principal plus prepayments) from $1,000,000 of ten
percent 30 year mortgages. The first of these tables is calculated for the
1975—78 period and hence with B =—4.37.If interest rates climb to 15 percent,
the pattern of the cash flow from the ten percent mortgages is changed
significantly. For instance, the cash flow from the mortgages at age two is
reduced from $203,455 to $138,401. This is due entirely to the reduced prepayment22
TABLE 5
CONDITIONAL PAYOFF PROBABILITIES AS A FUNCTION OF MORTGAGE AGE
Estimated Hazard
Function
A(a) StandardDeviation
Age (%) (%)
1 5.59 0.79
2 11.18 0.91
3 15.34 0.97
4 17.99 1.10
5 18.38 1.23
6 18.67 1.46
7 15.85 1.70
8 11.52 1.65
9 8.66 1.56
10 11.29 1.60
11 10.31 1.44
12 12.36 1.48
13 13.80 1.55
14 16.73 1.86
15 13.73 2.06
16 14.93 2.69
17 25.65 4.17
18 30.70 5.71
19 22.15 6.17
20 19.19 7.04
21 19.41 7.79
22 17.91 9.37
23 20.92 13.09
24 17.79 11.36
25 7.70 7.39
26 10.15 9.61
27 11.39 10.70
28 17.77 16.1123
TABLE 6
CASH FLOWS FROM $1,000,000 IN 10% MORTGAGES AS A FUNCTION
OFAGE MiDMARKET INTEREST RATES
(for1975—78;8 =—4.37)
Age 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15%
1 160,876 145,890 136,169 129,587 124,964 121,615
2 203,455 180,731 164,629 153,095 144,676 138,401
3 214,042 196,028 180,574 168,187 158,470 150,865
4 198,497 191,944 182,585 173,158 164,731 157,560
5 164,049 168,788 167,885 164,162 159,425 154.613
6 134,341 145,630 151,147 152,613 151,694 149,576
7 98,271 111,622 121,011 126,813 129,918 131,218
8 69,058 81,155 91,144 98,744 104,187 107,920
9 53,156 63,741 73,202 81,091 87,354 92,173
10 54,448 65,712 75,977 84,689 91,696 97,124
11 45,850 56,001 65,654 74,254 81,540 87,497
12 44,468 54,678 64,606 73,667 81,531 88,105
13 40,790 50,533 60,253 69,388 77,569 84,627
14 38,527 48,039 57,739 67,092 75,702 83,341
15 28,405 35,700 43,349 50,979 58,279 65,036
16 25,170 31,764 38,778 45,897 52,844 59,412
17 28,772 36,402 44,588 52,982 61,269 69,202
18 23,440 29,799 36,738 44,005 51,361 58,601
19 12,811 16,357 20,286 24,482 28,830 33,226
20 8,914 11,401 14,174 17,158 20,281 23,475
21 7,001 8,963 11,158 13,530 16,026 18,594
22 5,209 6,673 8,315 10,095 11,975 13,918
23 4,413 5,656 7,051 8,566 10,170 11,832
24 3,069 3,935 4,907 5,966 7,088 8,253
25 1,837 2,355 2,938 3,573 4,247 4,948
26 1,734 2,224 2,775 3,375 4,012 4,674
27 1,513 1,940 2,421 2,944 3,500 4,079
28 1,367 1,753 2,187 2,660 3,162 3,685
29 859 1,102 1,375 1,672 1,988 2,317
30 859 1,102 1,375 1,672 1,988 2,31724
TABLE7
CASH FLOWS FROM $1,000,000 IN 10%' MORTGAGES AS A FUNCTION
OF AGE AND MARKET INTERESTRATES
(for 1979—82;8—13.07)
Age 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15%
1 160,876 127,068 115,000 110,152 108,000 106,960
2 203,455 148,650 125,723 115,816 111,200 108,881
3 214,042 163,271 134,821 121,187 114,474 110,969
4 198,497 169,164 141,258 125,695 117,494 113,026
5 164,049 162,232 141,970 127,507 119,136 114,337
6 134,341 125,692 141,562 129,070 120,822 115,777
7 98,271 128,786 130,650 124,216 118,552 114,679
8 69,058 101,673 113,879 114,732 113,041 111,319
9 53,156 84,284 101,664 107,359 108,613 108,568
10 54,448 88,255 107,826 113,554 113,884 112,832
11 45,850 77,854 100,260 109,313 111,706 111,767
12 44,468 77,503 102,623 113,405 116,146 115,911
13 40,790 73,303 100,933 114,527 118,739 118,980
14 38,527 71,137 101,709 118,612 124,546 125,211
15 28,405 54,312 82,348 101,816 111,760 115,849
16 25,170 49,023 76,801 98,227 110,564 116,437
17 28,772 56,680 90,587 118,052 134,181 141,390
18 23,440 47,218 78,940 108,779 130,011 142,283
19 12,811 26,341 46,084 67,773 86,859 101,295
20 8,914 18,482 32,978 50,044 66,607 80,704
21 7,001 14,582 26,308 40,664 55,418 68,889
22 5,209 10,884 19,795 31,025 43,086 54,739
23 4,413 9,238 16,877 26,663 37,445 48,215
24 3,069 6,435 11,802 18,779 26,647 34,759
25 1,837 3,854 7,086 11,326 16,180 21,291
26 1,734 3,640 6,696 10,712 15,322 20,193
27 1,513 3,176 5,845 9,357 13,400 17,688
28 1,367 2,869 5,281 8,459 12,122 16,016
29 859 1,804 3,321 5,321 7,629 10,087
30 859 1,804 3,321 5,321 7,629 10,08725
experience. The cash flow is higher at 15 percent than at ten percent for
older mortgages because more of the mortgages survive to these ages. For
instance, at 20 years, the cash flow at ten percent Is $8,914, whereas at
15 percent, it is $23,475.
During the 1979—82 Wellenkamp period, this sensitivity of cash flows
to interest rates was greatly Increased as is evidenced by Table 7. In this
period, $1,000,000 of ten percent mortgages could be expected to generate
$203,455 at age 2 with interest rates at ten percent, but only $108,881 at
15 percent interest. At age 20, the numbers are $8,914 at tenpercent versus
$80,704 at 15 percent. This nine to one ratio reflects the vastlygreater
interest payments from the much greater number of old mortgages in the 15percent
case.
These cash flows can be put in perspective by calculating theirpresent
value at the time of issue. This is done in Table 8. It shows that as market
interest rates rise from ten percent to 15 percent, the value of themortgages
falls 22.74 percent if they are due—on—sale and 28.10 percent if that clause
cannot be enforced. Both numbers exceed the fall in value that would be
experienced by a fixed maturity instrument of the same duration, of course, but
the Interesting thing to note is the very significant difference between the
effects in the two regimes. The loss with 15 percent interest is 23.6percent
greater in the Wellenkamp era, resulting in the mortgages losing 5.36 percent
of their value over and above what they would have lost in a due—on—sale
environment. This 5.36 percent difference could easily eliminate the netequity
position of a savings and loan. Thus, the table Indicates both that the value
of mortgages is highly sensitive to interest rates and that this valuedepends
significantly on the rules regarding due—on—sale.26
TABLE 8
P1ESENT VALUE OF 10% MORTGAGE CASH FLOWS AS A FUNCTION
OF MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES
10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15%
8 =—4.37;1975—78 995,483 951,491 905,240858,571 812,863769,083
(loss as % of originalPV) ... 4.42 9.07 13.75 18.34 22.74
8 =—13.07;1979—82
•
995,483 944,723 883,887322,810 766,357715,740
(loss as Z of originalPV). . . 5.10 11.21 17.35 23.01 28.10
loss at 8—13.07as a
fraction of loss at
8 =—4.37
.. . 1.154 1.236 1.262 1.255 1.236
difference in loss as
% of original
.. 0.68 2.14 3.60 4.67 5.36
TABLE 9
AVERAGE TIME
.
TOPAYOFF FOR 10% MORTGAGES AS
OF MARKETINTEREST RATES
A FUNCTION
.
10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15%
8 =—4.37 5.831 6.610 7.331 7.982 8.563 9.076
8 =—13.07 5.831 8.25510.33711.85512.88613.56027
The sensitivity of the average time to repayment to interest rates
is shown in Table 9 for ten percent mortgages. The figures indicate that a
ten percent mortgage will, on average, prepay in 7.331 years if market rates
have gone up to 12 percent and due—on—sale clauses are enforced. If mortgages
are assumable, the average time to repayment is 10.337 years. The numbers
indicate that interest rate changes alone are sufficient to account for
the changing rule of thumb regarding standard lifetime assumptions, but
they also indicate how inappropriate any fixed rule of thumb really is.
5. Conclusion
We began this research with the feeling that the determinants of
prepayment experience had received too little attention. The importance of
the matter seemed far too great to uncritically rely on rules of thumb to
assess prepayment likelihoods. The first thing we learned in this study was
that the data to examine prepayment experience are not readily available.
While longitudinal panel surveys do exist for households, similar information
regarding mortgages does not seem to be publicly available. We have corrected
this situation to an extent by collecting information on 3,938 individual
mortgages which were active in 1975 and 1976 and by following them through 1982.
Certainly research in the area of mortgage evaluation would be aided by better
data. We found the institutions quite willing to provide the data and were
limited only by the usual time and money constraints.
Our results indicate that market interest rates are a significant
determinant of prepayment probabilities. When due—on—sale clauses were applicable,
our information indicates that a ten percent lock—in reduces prepayment
probabilities 35 percent. If the clause cannot be enforced, the reduction in28
probability becomes 63 percent. Both of these effects would be eliminated
if mortgages had floating interest rates. Our analysis indicates that the
rules regarding due—on—sale clauses significantly affect the value of
mortgage portfolios, possibly enough in some circumstances to wipe out the
net worth of savings and loan institutions. We also find that the average
age to prepayment is highly dependent on interest rates.29
Footnotes
1. The method which resulted in the B =—4.37estimate looked only at the
mortgages which were at risk in the 1975—78 window. An alternative
consistent estimator under the maintained hypothesis of the Proportional
Hazards Model would include the experience of these mortgages in the
pre—1975 period as well, notwithstanding the fact that the sample is
selected so as to include only those which survive to 1975. Reestimating
with this alternative, we find B =—2.52with a standard error of .46.
The discussion will stick with the original estimate, but this alternative
procedure confirms the significant effect of the Wellenkamp decision on
mortgage prepayment.30
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